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RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES ON THE WELL SITE
Douglas M. Carson
DAILY, WEST, CORE, COFFMAN & CANFIELD
Fort Smith, Arkansas
Introduction. This paper considers three basic areas of law which may become
involved when a person suffers a physical injury on an oil or gas well site. The first area
considers the basic tort liabilities and defenses which may arise. But parties involved in the
drilling and operating end of the oil and gas business frequently carry liability insurance to
protect against tort claims. The second portion of this paper therefore considers issues
which may arise relating to insurance coverage of claims. Finally, usually the direct
employer of the injured person is immune from tort liability and the employee’s remedy is
limited to w orkers’ compensation. T hat is the last major topic.
This paper presents only an overview of a number of im portant issues which may
arise in the personal injury claim or lawsuit. The potential tort, insurance, and workers’
compensation laws which may apply in any given case arise from such extensive, welldeveloped bodies of law that this paper should be viewed as stating general principles only.
Accordingly, when analyzing the issues involved in an actual claim or lawsuit, prim ary
legal sources should be consulted and relied on.
PART 1: TORT LIABILITY
I. TO RT LIABILITY DEFINED.
Tort liability is generally defined as a liability imposed by law for causing injury to
or death of another person or damage to or destruction of a n o th er’s property. Tort law is
often contrasted to contract law. Contractual liability arises out of a duty which one has
agreed to assume, either expressly or by implication either arising from conduct indicating
the existence of an agreement, or from some relation or dealing between the parties which
the law finds su fficien t to assume agreement existed. In contrast, tort liability is imposed

by law, in the absence o f any specific agreem ent by the d e fe n d a n t to be liable. Part of this
topic, however, considers the e ffe c t of one p a rty ’s agreeing to be responsible fo r another
p a rty ’s to rt lia b ility u n d e r an in d em n ity co n tract or sim ilar agreement.
For nonlaw yers review ing this paper, a "tortfeasor" is a p arty who commits, or at
least is legally responsible for, an act w hich causes an in ju ry giving rise to a tort liability.
An in ju re d p a rty who files a law suit becomes a "plain tiff" and the to rtfeaso r becomes the
"d efen d an t. "

II.

IN T E N T IO N A L TORTS.

A. G e n era l.

An in te n tio n a l to rt is a liab ility imposed by law fo r an act w hich the to rtfeaso r
in ten d ed to do. For to rt law purposes, the actor "intends" the consequences of his act if
e ith er his goal is to bring about the consequence or there is a su b stan tial certain ty th a t these
consequences will result fro m his in ten d ed act.
Common in te n tio n a l torts include assault, b attery , trespass to land, and trespass to
chattels (tangible personal property). The im p o rtan t point is th a t the legal m eaning of
"intent" includes simply an in te n t to do the act and is not lim ited to an in te n t to cause the
harm.

B. Agency Issues.

This topic is discussed in detail in the "negligence" section o f this paper. For present
purposes, it is im p o rta n t to u n d e rstan d th a t a person who is legally liable fo r an o th er
person’s conduct, such as an employer or prin cip al in a principal-agent relationship, can be
liable even fo r the employee’s or ag en t’s in ten tio n al torts if the in ten tio n al tort in some way
related to or arose out of the em ployer’s or p rin c ip a l’s business. The key point is th a t the
employer or p rin c ip a l d id not have to authorize, order, or even know the in ten tio n al tort
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was being committed if it arose out of the pursuit of the business.
For example, if a f ight broke out on a well site, an employer or principal could be
liable fo r the employee’s or ag en t’s beating up or killing another well hand or the land
owner if the cause of the problem or altercation was connected with the well site operations.
In perhaps the most extreme example of how truly far-reach in g this principle can extend, a
court held a delivery service liable to a female customer who was raped by a delivery man.
When the delivery man showed up to deliver fu rn itu re , a dispute arose between the delivery
man and the customer over w hether he was required to haul the fu r n itu re upstairs or only
deliver it to the fro n t door. The argum ent became heated, turned violent, and the delivery
man raped the customer. There was no claim th at the employer in any way authorized,
instructed, or even should have foreseen the rape because of the delivery m an’s past history.
Nevertheless, the employer was held civilly liable to the customer for the rape (a form of
the intentional tort of battery). L yon v. C arey. 533 F.2d 649 (D. C. Cir. 1976).
III. NEGLIGENCE.
A. D e fin itio n .

A p la in tif f ’s prim a facie case for negligence requires proving (a) a duty of the
d e fe n d a n t to conform to a specific standard of conduct to protect the p la in tif f against an
unreasonable risk of injury; (b) the d e fe n d a n t’s breach of that duty; (c) that the breach of
the du ty was the actual and proxim ate cause of the injury; and (d) damage as a result of the
breach of that duty.
In a negligence case, the general duty of the d e fe n d an t is to act as a reasonable,
o rdinary, p ru d en t person would under the same or similar circumstances. If the d e fe n d an t
is engaged in some profession requiring special skills or knowledge (such as drillin g a gas
well or practicing medicine), then the d e fe n d a n t’s conduct is measured against the actions
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of a reasonable person practicing that profession or perform ing that specialized job.

B. To Whom Is the Duty Owed?
A d uty of care generally is owed only to reasonably foreseeable plaintiffs. It is not
necessary, however, th a t the d efe n d an t foresee harm to the specific p la in tiff or even know
that the p la in tiff existed at the time of the act if injury to a person in the p la in tif f ’s
situation was reasonably foreseeable. For example, incorrectly perform ed seismic testing
proxim ately causing a worsening of ground water quality potentially could allow any
landow ner a ffe cted by the change in water quality to m aintain a lawsuit, even if that
landow ner did not own the land on which the seismic testing was done and even if the
d e fe n d an t did not know th a t p articu lar p la in tiff existed.
C.

Rules R elating to Owners and Occupiers of L and.

If someone else, such as a gas well operator drilling pursuant to the lease, is lawfully
occupying the ow ner’s land, the duty of care to avoid injury to others is placed upon that
occupant. Arkansas m aintains the distinction between trespassers, licensees, and invitees
and the d u ty owed to each.
1.

Trespassers.

U n d er A rkansas law, an owner, lessee, or occupant of property owes a trespasser no
duty until the trespasser’s presence on the premises is known. Once the trespasser’s presence
is known, the owner or occupant owes the trespasser only a duty not to cause him injury by
w illful or wanton conduct. Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-108.
An exception to this rule exists for child trespassers under the "attractive nuisance
doctrine. " The landow ner or occupant has the duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid
reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to children caused by artificia l conditions on the
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property. The "attractive nuisance" doctrine involves cases in which the owner or occupier
of the land knows or should know th at young persons freq u e n t the vicinity of the
dangerous condition, th a t the condition or activity is likely to a ttra c t a ch ild ’s interest or
attention, and th a t the condition is likely to cause injury, p artic u la rly because of the ch ild ’s
in ab ility to appreciate the risk. It is easy to conceive of a court declaring drilling
operations to be an a ttra ctiv e nuisance and to fin d the operator or the various companies
involved in drilling activities liable for in ju ry to a child u nder the "attractive nuisance
doctrine. "
2.

Licensees.

A licensee is a person on the land, with the owner or occupier’s express or implied
permission, fo r the licensee’s personal b enefit and not the owner or occupier’s benefit. For
example, a traveling salesman who is on the property for the purpose of attem p tin g a sale is
a licensee if he or she is there w ith the owner or occupier’s permission.
The owner or occupier owes the licensee no duty until the licensee’s presence is
known; then the ow ner or occupier owes the licensee a duty not to cause in ju ry by w illful or
w anton conduct, but if the licensee is in a position of danger, the owner or occupier must
use o rd in ary care to avoid in ju rin g the licensee.

3.

Invitees.

An invitee is one who is on the premises for a purpose connected with the owner or
o ccupant’s business or fo r a purpose connected with an activity from which the owner or
occupant expects to receive a benefit. For example, all of the subcontractors hired by an oil
or gas well operator on the premises pu rsu an t to a lease o rd in arily would be invitees.
A d e fe n d a n t owes an invitee a d u ty to use o rd in a ry care to m ain tain the premises in
a reasonably safe condition or to otherwise use o rd in a ry care for the in v itee’s safety.
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4.

States O ther T h an A rkansas.

A num ber of states have abolished the trespass/licensee/invitee distinctions and hold
th a t the ow ner or occupier owes everyone on the premises a d u ty of o rd in ary care to refrain
fro m causing injury. A rkansas, as noted, still m aintains the th ree-p art distinction.
5.

The G eneral Rules as Applied and R efin ed in Specific
Cases.
(a)

U n safe C ondition of the Premises.

The operator can have a d u ty either to keep the premises safe fo r employees of the
subcontractors or to w arn of dangerous conditions. For example, in Sun Oil Co. v. Massey.
594 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) w rit r e f ’d n.r.e. [w rit for fu r th e r appeal refused on the
basis th a t the interm ed iate appellate decision contained no reversible error], an employee of
an in d ependent contractor rew orking an oil well was electrocuted. He was killed when a
guy wire came into contact w ith a power line. The jury fo u n d that in the process of
rew orking the well Sun Oil had created a dangerous condition which it knew or should have
know n about and, accordingly, th a t Sun Oil failed to make the premises reasonably safe for
the su b co n tracto r’s employee. The Texas Court of Appeals a ffirm e d a ju ry verdict for the
p la in tiff , holding th a t Sun had a legal d uty to protect the su b co n tracto r’s employee by
taking the reasonably available steps of either relocating the lines or shutting o ff the power.
L iab ility fo r "failure to warn" was imposed in G utierrez v. Exxon C orp., 764 F.2d 399
(5th Cir. 1985). In th a t case, Exxon hired Johnson Tool Company to cut and cap an
abandoned well. The subcontractor used a "window technique" which caused a tremendous
do w n w ard pressure by the inner casing on the outer casing. The p la in tiff, an employee of
Johnson Tool, was c u ttin g the inner casing when the outer casing collapsed from the weight
an d in ju red the p la in tiff. The ju ry concluded th at Exxon knew that the outer casing could
not support the in n er casing a f te r the "windows" were cut. The appellate court a ffirm ed ,
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ruling that Exxon had a duty to warn of dangerous conditions that it knew or should have
known existed i f the danger was not reasonably apparent to persons such as Johnson Tool
and its employees.
Gutierrez is interesting because the court treated it as a "premises defect" case
although the premises, specifically the gas well, were not in a dangerous condition un til the
subcontractor began its welding and cutting operations. Nevertheless, because the "window
technique" had been used on approximately 200 Exxon wells, the court concluded that
Exxon should have been aware of the danger the technique created.
(b)

Dangerous Conditions Arising Out of the
Work Performed by an Independent
Contractor.

In general, the duty to furnish a safe place to work or to protect
trespassers/licensees/invitees from harm is qualified by the rule that one who engages an
independent contractor to do the work is not liable fo r hazards that arise out of or are
incidental to the work which the independent contractor was hired to perform.
(1) Arkansas Cases.
In Arkansas it is a firmly-established rule that a defendant is not liable for the torts
of an independent contractor. As the Arkansas Supreme Court expressly declared:
An employer of an independent contractor is not liable fo r the
independent contractor’s torts which are committed in the
performance of the contracted work.
Blankenship v. Overholt. 301 Ark. 476, 478, 786 S.W.2d 814, 815 (1990).
The court in Blankenship considered the varied factors that are considered in
determining whether a tortfeasor is an independent contractor or a servant/employee.
These include the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may impose over
the details of the work; whether the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or
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business; the kind of occupation; the skill required; the identity of the person furnishing
the instruments, tools, and place of work; the length of time for which the person is
employed; the method of payment; whether or not the work is part of the regular business
of the employer; whether the parties believe they are creating a master-servant or
independent contractor relationship; and whether the principal is engaged in business. Of
all these factors, the extent of control is the principal factor in defining the relationship.
Id. at 479, 786 S.W.2d at 815. The court in Blankenship then summarized the rule:
By a long line of decisions this court is committed to the
universal rule, that where the contractor is to produce a certain
result, according to specific and definite contractual directions,
agreed upon and made a part of the contract, and the duty of
the contractor is to produce the net result by means and
methods of his own choice, and the owner is not concerned with
the physical conduct of either the contractor or his employees,
then the contract does not create the relation of master and
servant. This court has consistently accepted and stated the
settled rule that even though control and direction be retained
by the owner, the relation of master and servant is not thereby
created unless such control and direction relate to the physical
conduct of the contractor in the performance of the work with
respect to the details thereof.
Id. at 479-80, 786 S.W.2d at 816.
The rule is perhaps most succinctly stated in the Arkansas Model Instruction on this
point:
An independent contractor is one who, in the course of his
independent occupation, is responsible for the performance of
certain work, uses his own methods to accomplish it, and is
subject to the control of the employer only as to the result of
his work.
AMI 707.
In Blankenship, the court reviewed the facts and concluded that the employer "was
not concerned w ith the physical conduct of the contractor. Instead, he was concerned with
the result." Id . at 480, 786 S.W.2d at 816. This meant that the defendant-employer was not
liable fo r the p la in tiff’s damages. Even the fact that the employer specified that a certain
type of bracing would be employed in doing that particular work was not sufficient,
8

because th a t was not supervision of the w ork but ra th e r a sp ecificatio n of the result to be
obtained. A ccordingly, the A rkansas Supreme C ourt reversed the v erd ict ag ain st the master
and dismissed him fro m the case.
Some A rkansas a u th o rity indicates th a t the general c o n tra c to r’s re ta in in g of the
rig h t to m onitor the progress of the d rillin g project is not dispositive. The ratio n ale is th at
anybody who hires an in d e p en d e n t co n tra cto r may and should retain the rig h t to approve
the work p erform ed. As a fe d e ral d istric t court applying A rkansas law has held, "The right
to approve or reject the result of the work does not destroy the in d e p en d e n t co n tracto r
relationship." Wright v. N ew m an . 539 F. Supp. 1331, 1338-39 (W.D. Ark. 1982).

(2) Texas Cases.

Texas, u n lik e A rkansas, has produced a num ber of reported decisions involving
personal in ju ries in oil and gas operations. Many of these decisions deal w ith the varying
duties of d if f e r e n t parties involved in the operation when the in ju ry or d e ath occurred. In
Texas, earlier cases suggested th a t the o perator has no d u ty to w arn or protect a
su b co n tracto r fro m dangerous conditions created by the subcontractor. For example, in
Abalos v. Oil D evelopm ent Co. of Texas. 544 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1976), the p la in tif f sued the
d e fe n d a n t fo r in ju ries sustained while w orking on the d e fe n d a n t’s lease in the employ of an
in d e p en d e n t co ntractor. The facts in d icate th a t an employee of the d e fe n d a n t was aw are of
the d an g er created by the su b co n trac to r’s acts but did not take any im m ediate action. The
p la in tif f was cau g h t an d severely in ju red in the dangerous m achinery. The s u b co n trac to r’s
employee sued the o p erato r on the theory th a t the o p e ra to r’s employee owed a d u ty to w arn
the p la in tif f or to stop the pump. The Texas Supreme C ourt a ffir m e d a d e f e n d a n t’s motion
fo r in stru c te d v erdict, concluding:
[W]here the a ctiv ity is conducted by, and is u n d er the control
of, an in d e p en d e n t co n tracto r, and where the d an g er arises out
o f the a c tiv ity s ta f f, the responsibility or d u ty is th a t o f the
in d e p en d e n t co n tracto r, and not th a t of the ow ner of the
9

premises.
Id. at 631. Significantly, the d e fe n d a n t’s employee had not merely noticed the danger but
had assisted the subcontractor by starting the pump which caused the injury. Nevertheless,
the operator was relieved of liability because the p la in tif f ’s employer, who was the
operator’s subcontractor, m aintained direction and control of the entire activity which
caused the injury.
The operator was fo u n d liable in R em uda Oil & Gas Co. v. Nobles. 613 S.W.2d 312
(Tex. Civ. App. 1981) no w rit. In th at case, R em uda hired Nobles to flow back an oil well.
D uring the course of perform ing the work, Nobles was struck by an unsecured flow line.
Significantly, Nobles told a Rem uda representative that the method being used was
dangerous and the R em uda supervisor told Nobles to use the procedure, despite Nobles’
misgivings. In this case, the court disregarded the general rule shielding the employer of an
independent contractor from liability and held that the operator was liable. The rationale
was th at the activ ity which injured the p la in tiff was perform ed pursuant to procedures
specifically m andated or required by the operator. Furtherm ore, the o perator’s employee on
the site told the other contractors on the site that he (as the operator’s representative) was
"in charge." The court reasoned th at the operator should be held liable because it actively
in te rfe re d w ith the c o n tracto r’s work.
An interesting case representing some sort of a mid-point between Abalos and
Rem uda is T an n er v, BD & K Production Co., 671 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. App. 1984) no w rit. In
th at case, the court held th at the operator’s employee had not become so involved in the
subcontractor’s work as to impose liability on the operator even though the operator’s
employee specifically instructed the BD & K tool pusher to "hurry up. " The court
concluded th a t simply trying to keep things on schedule was not su fficien t interference
with the su b co n tracto r’s work so as to make the operator responsible for the injury.
If in terferen ce with the contractor can make the operator liable, then "joint control"
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over the operation or a portion of the operation also can make the operator liable. In Shell
Oil Co. v. Waxle r, 652 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. App. 1983) w rit r e f ’d n.r.e., a near-stampede of
employees at a large re fin e ry trying to leave work through a narrow gate injured the
p la in tiff, who was an employee of an independent contractor doing construction work at a
refinery. The court concluded th at both the project owner and the contractor were jointly
liable in p art because Shell employed a safety representative to insure th at Shell's
contractors were perform ing their jobs safely. In addition, Shell’s security guards were
responsible fo r opening and closing the gate where the p la in tiff was injured. The court
could have a ffirm e d the verdict fo r the injured worker simply on the ground that Shell
m aintained actual physical control over the gate. The court went beyond th a t rationale,
however, noting th a t Shell had a safety representative whose job included insuring th at the
contractors perform ed their duties safely.
The court seemed to extend the decision in Waxier by fin d in g an a ffirm a tiv e duty
on the p art of the operator to in terfere with the subcontractors in Tovar v. Amarillo Oil
Co., 692 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. 1985). In that case, the court found th at the operator knew of the
subcontractor’s deviation from standard procedures and knew the deviation could be
dangerous, but did not in te rfe re with the work of the contractor. The contract between the
operator and the subcontractor, however, gave the operator the right to shut down the
operation in the event of carelessness, inattention, or incompetency by the subcontractor.
The court concluded th at this right to shut down the operation, coupled with the o perator’s
knowledge of the danger, am ounted to a duty to exercise reasonable care in supervising the
activity and protecting subcontractors’ employees on the job site.
Supervising safety was even taken to a greater extent in Exxon C orp. v. Roberts. 724
S.W.2d 863 (Tex. App. 1986) w rit r e f ’d n.r.e. In th at case, two in d ependent contractors were
working on an Exxon lease to raise some casing tools from the ground to the rig floor. An
employee of one of the contractors was killed. The court concluded th at Exxon was liable
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under the facts because Exxon exercised control over the procedures used and, fu rth er, did
not hold a safety meeting and did not require the injured employee’s contractor to hold a
safety meeting. The court specifically held th at "the absence of a rule requiring such
meetings could be negligence and proxim ate cause in a case of this type. " Id. at 868.
The op erato r is not always liable in Texas, however. In Shell Oil Co. v. Songer. 710
S.W.2d 615 (Tex. App. 1986) w rit r e f ’d n.r.e., Shell hired electricians as independent
contractors. One of the su b co n tracto r’s employees received a severe electrical shock. On
appeal, the court reversed an assignment of 50 percent of the negligence to Shell. The court
concluded th a t the electrical work being done was a specialized activity and th at the
p la in tif f ’s employer (the subcontractor) was in a superior position to oversee the work and
elim inate the dangerous condition. Thus, if the dangerous condition is in a su fficien tly
specialized area and the operator makes no attem pt to control the work being done in that
area, then the operator may still be found not liable.
The overall im pact of these decisions seems to be to set up a rule where the operator
is in a better legal position not to concern itself with safety considerations. Although
Songer did still recognize an o p erato r’s nonliability, the cases holding the operator liable are
troubling. The message o f the Texas opinions, taken as a whole, seems to be th at the
operator can best protect itself by making no safety requirem ents, not involving itself in the
subcontracted activities, and not concerning itself with the safety of its subcontractors at
all. The more involved the operator becomes in safety considerations, the more likely the
operator is to be fo u n d liable to an in ju red employee on the ground th at it exercised joint
control over the subcontracted work.
It should be the policy of the law to encourage activities which will reduce the
num ber of deaths and injuries, not simply add to the list of d efen d an ts who can be sued
when an accident occurs. U n fo rtu n ate ly , in Texas an operator who is overly concerned
w ith the safety of the su b co n tracto r’s employees seems to be exposing itself to greater, not
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less, liability.
IV.

STRICT LIABILITY.
A.

Liability Issues.

Strict liability exists in Arkansas by statute. In Arkansas, a "supplier" of a product is
subject to liability for harm to a person or property if (1) the supplier is engaged in the
business of "m anufacturing, assembling, selling, leasing, or otherwise distributing" the
product, (2) the product is in a defective condition which renders it unreasonably
dangerous, and (3) the defective condition is a proximate cause of the injury. Thus, if an
injury is caused either by a defectively designed or m anufactured piece of equipment or by
a defective installation of equipment, then the "supplier" of the product, which could
include anybody involved in d istributing the product from the original m an u factu rer to the
subcontractor who "supplies" the product at the well site, can be found liable.
The d efin itio n of "supplier" is decidedly broad. The author of this paper has been
involved in or is aw are of several severe injury lawsuits which involved an allegedly
m alfunctioning piece of drilling or production equipment. In each case, v irtually every
person or company (other than the p la in tif f ’s employer) who had anything to do with the
allegedly defective equipment was sued as a "supplier. "
The product must be supplied in a "defective condition, " which is defined by statute
as meaning "a condition of a product that renders it unsafe for reasonably foreseeable use
and consumption. " Note that under this definition the use does not have to be that which
was intended by the supplier, only that use which was "reasonably foreseeable. " Thus, a
m an u factu rer or supplier of a product has a duty under Arkansas law to guard against
dangers which not only are inherent in the product’s intended use but which also may arise
from any "reasonably foreseeable" use, w hether the product is intended to be used that way
or not.
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The d e fin itio n of "unreasonably dangerous" also is important. U nder the statute, to
be "unreasonably dangerous" a product must be
dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contem plated by the o rdinary and reasonable buyer, consumer
or user who acquires or uses such product, assuming the
o rd in a ry knowledge of the community, or of similar buyers,
users or consumers, as to its characteristics, propensities, risks,
dangers and proper and improper uses, as well as any special
knowledge, train in g or experience possessed by the p articu lar
buyer, user or consumer or which he or she was required to
possess. However, as to a minor, "unreasonably dangerous"
means th a t a product is dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by an ordinary and reasonably
carefu l minor considering his age and intelligence.
Significantly, this d e fin itio n recognizes that some products are intended to be used
in specialized settings and operated by people with specialized knowledge. Thus, products
which are used in connection with the drilling and producing of an oil or gas well must be
evaluated not by the stan d ard of w hether they would be dangerous to the ordinary person
but w hether they are unreasonably dangerous to those well-site workers under their
knowledge, training, experience, and reasonable contemplation.
B.

Defenses.

The A rkansas Product Liability Act provides a number of statutory defenses. These
include:
1.

A three-year statute of limitations from the date on which the death, injury,

or damage occurred. If the injured person is a minor, then the statute of limitations does
not begin to run until th a t person reaches the age of majority or otherwise has their
disability removed.
2.

Compliance with any federal or state statute or adm inistrative regulation

existing at the time the product was m an u factu red which prescribes standards of design,
inspection, testing, m an u factu re, labeling, warning, or instructions for use "shall be
considered as evidence th a t a product is not in an unreasonably dangerous condition"
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insofar as the claims of defect were covered by the standards. Note that this is not an
"absolute" defense, but merely a statement that this type of evidence "shall be considered as
evidence. "
3.

Supplying a product a fte r its anticipated life may be considered a defense by

the m an u factu rer as between the m an u factu rer and supplier if the product is supplied after
the expiration date placed on the product by the m an u factu rer as required by law. (In
practical terms, this defense would have little application to oil and gas well site injuries,
because the "expiration date" required by law usually applies only to food and drugs. ")
4.

Use of a product beyond its anticipated life by a consumer when the

consumer knew or should have known the anticipated life of the product. Again, this is not
an absolute defense but merely one which "may be considered as evidence of fa u lt on the
part of the consumer. "
5.

The ju ry may also consider the state of scientific and technical knowledge

available to the m a n u fa ctu rer or supplier at the time the product was placed on the market,
rather than at the time of injury. This again is not an "absolute" defense, but merely
recognizes the kind of evidence which may be placed before the jury. This defense does not
apply to actions based on express w arranties or misrepresentation regarding the product.
The rationale obviously is that a d efen d an t should not be able to m aintain that a certain
design or m an u factu rin g feature was technically impossible at the time the product was
m an u factu red if the d e fe n d an t was expressly stating that the safety featu re existed on the
particular product at issue.
6.

If a product was not unreasonably dangerous at the time it left the control of

the m an u factu rer or supplier, but was made unreasonably dangerous by subsequent
"unforeseeable alteration, change, improper maintenance, or abnormal use, " then that
conduct may be considered as evidence of fau lt on the part of the user.
Note th at the alteration must not merely make the product dangerous but it must be
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an "unforeseeable" alteration. There are many cases in the product liability field holding
that the user’s removing of safeguards, lockout mechanisms, and other safety features did
not prohibit recovery by the p la in tiff if removal of the safety featu re made the product
easier to operate and removal of that safety feature was reasonably foreseeable to the
m an u fa ctu rer/su p p lier. This rule allowing an injured person to recover damages for an
accident caused by a machine which has had safety features removed has been widely
criticized, but it remains the law in most jurisdictions. Note th at there may be a
distinction, however, between the particu lar p la in tiff being the person who actually
removed the safety featu re and a p la in tiff who (especially if on the job) uses a product
which had safety features removed by the employer or some other employee. In the former
situation, if the person who is injured is the one who actually removed the safety device,
then com parative fa u lt principles (discussed below) may apply. On the other hand, if the
p la in tiff was merely required to use equipment which had been altered by some other
employee or by the employer, then courts are much more reluctant to assess fau lt against the
user-plaintiff.
7.
V.

Com parative fault. This is discussed in Section VI below.

U LTR A H A ZA R D O U S ACTIVITIES.
In Arkansas, ultrahazardous activities are limited to those which are uncommon and

which involve a risk of personal injury or property damage which cannot be eliminated
with the exercise of even utmost care. Typically, in Arkansas ultrahazardous activities are
activities such as spraying poisonous chemicals and blasting. O ther than seismic testing
which may precede the drilling of a well, drilling an oil or gas well has not been declared
an u ltrah azard o u s activity in Arkansas because it can be done safely.
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VI.

G EN ERA L TO R T DEFENSES.

Although there may be any number of legal defenses to a p a rticu lar action, such as
the ru n n in g of the statute of limitations, consent, license, waiver, accord and satisfaction,
etc., the most relevant defense for present purposes is the defense of contributory or
com parative fault. A rkansas has by statute enacted a com parative fa u lt statute which
provides th a t if the p la in tif f ’s fa u lt is equal to or greater than the fa u lt of all defendants,
then the p la in tiff cannot recover. In Oklahoma, in contrast, a p la in tiff is not barred from
recovery unless the p la in tif f ’s fa u lt is greater than th at of all defendants. In either state,
the aw ard of damages is reduced according to the percentage of com parative fault, up to
the point where the degree of fa u lt bars recovery completely. Due to the d ifferen ce
between A rkansas and Oklahoma, however, a p la in tiff who is 50 percent at fa u lt in
Arkansas recovers nothing while a p la in tiff who is 50 percent at fa u lt in Oklahoma is
entitled to recover one-half of the total damages.
When there are multiple defendants, the p la in tif f ’s fau lt is compared with that of all
defendants, not each individually. For example, assume a jury found the p la in tiff twenty
percent at fau lt, d e fe n d an t no. 1 ten percent at fault, and d e fe n d an t no. 2 seventy percent
at fault. In th a t situation the p la in tif f ’s recovery would be reduced tw enty percent, but the
p la in tiff would still have a judgm ent for the rem aining eighty percent of damages against
both defendants. D efen d an t no. 1 does not escape a judgm ent simply because its share of
fa u lt is less than the p la in tif f ’s, because the total d e fe n d an ts’ share of fa u lt is greater than
the p la in tif f ’s.
VII.

AGENCY ISSUES: WHEN ONE IS LIABLE FOR A N O T H E R ’S ACTS.
As detailed previously in III.C.5. (b) of this paper, the classification of a person

working on a gas well as an "agent" of the operator or an "independent contractor" working
fo r the operator can have a substantial e ffe ct on the o p erato r’s liability. U nder general

17

Arkansas law, a principal who commits no independent action creating a direct tort liability
is legally responsible for the torts of an agent but not for the torts of an independent
contractor.
An agent is a person who, with the consent of the principal, acts for the principal
and is subject to the p rin cip al’s control. The agreement may be oral, w ritten, or implied
from the conduct of the parties. If the right to control exists at the time of the tortious
conduct, then the principal-agent relationship, and the resulting tran sfer of liabilities, may
exist at th a t time, even though the right of control may not have actually been exercised by
the principal.
In contrast, an independent contractor is one who, in the course of his independent
occupation, is responsible for the perform ance of certain work, uses his own methods to
accomplish it, and is subject to the control of the employer only as to the result of the work.
VIII. C O NTRIBUTIO N AND INDEMNITY.

A.

Overview: Distinguishing the Concepts and Summarizing the
Rules.

"Contribution" is the legal right existing as a m atter of law for one of several
tortfeasors jointly responsible to the injured person to pay no more than its proportionate
share of the damages by being reimbursed by other joint tortfeasors. Each "joint tortfeasor"
in dividually or "severally" is responsible to the injured p la in tiff for the entire judgment.
As between the joint tortfeasors, however, one who pays more than its apportioned share of
the judgm ent is entitled to seek contribution from the underpaying defendant(s). See Ark.
Code Ann. § 16-64-122.
In practical terms, for example, assume a jury verdict finds the p la in tiff not at all at
fa u lt (0%), d e fe n d a n t no. 1 is held one percent at fault, and d e fe n d an t no. 2 is held ninety-

18

nine percent at fault. If the d e fen d an t who is one percent at fau lt pays the faultless
p la in tiff the entire award, then that defen d an t is entitled to seek reimbursement
("contribution") of 99 percent of the payment from the other defendant. If, however, the
defen d an t who was 99 percent at fau lt has died, disappeared, gone out of business, or
simply does not have the money, that is simply the "one percent d e fe n d a n t’s" tough luck.
"Indemnity, " in contrast, is a right existing by contract, or sometimes implied by law
because of the parties’ business relationship, for one who has paid a settlement or judgment
to a p la in tiff to obtain complete (100 percent) repayment from another party. Without
attem pting to set forth exact language, indemnity provisions in w ritten contracts often will
state some or all of the following:
(1)

The subcontractor is expressly deemed to be an independent contractor

concerning all of the work w ithin the scope of the contract.
(2)

The contractor shall defend, indem nify, and hold the operator completely

harmless from any type of loss, claim, expense, or demand, including atto rn ey ’s fees.
(3)

The contractor will m aintain insurance to protect the operator, including

w orkmen’s compensation insurance, employer’s liability insurance, and comprehensive
general liability insurance. Usually the providing of a certificate of insurance is required
to establish compliance with the provision.
(4)

It is not unusual for contracts to require the subcontractor to indem nify the

operator fo r the total loss regardless of how fau lt for an injury to any third person is
apportioned between the operator, subcontractor, and any other th ird parties.
Many people, even many lawyers, often use the terms "contribution" and "indemnity"
as if they were either interchangeable terms or inextricably intertw ined phrases in the same
legal doctrine. They are not. "Contribution" is a tort law concept which grants repayment
rights to one paying more than its apportioned share of liability. "Indemnity" is a
contractual or quasi-contractual right to complete reimbursement.
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B.

Claims Against Fellow Employees.

As will be discussed below, an employee’s exclusive remedy against his or her direct
employer is workers* compensation, subject to a few limited exceptions. This means that an
employee in ju red in the course of employment cannot ordinarily file a tort suit against his
or her employer but can sue any non-employer tortfeasor who caused or contributed to the
injury. Where one or more joint to rtfeasors’ claims for contribution or indem nity from the
employer are present, however, the situation, as discussed below, can become more complex.
This section is strictly concerned w ith claims fo r joint tortfeasor contribution, not
express or implied contractual indem nity, from a fellow employee. The Arkansas Workers’
Compensation Act specifically provides th a t the rights and remedies granted to the
employee "shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of such employee... to recover
damages from such employer, or any principal, officer, director, stockholder, or partner
acting in th eir capacity as an employer.... " Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-105. In short, Arkansas
employees o rd in arily cannot sue their employer for work-related injuries except to make a
w orkers’ compensation claim.
Nevertheless, as detailed below, the A rkansas decisions have allowed tort suits
against fellow employees in some cases and disallowed them in others. The cases can be
resolved under the following rules:
(1)

If the only negligence alleged against the fellow employee is negligence in

failing to provide a safe place to work, then the workers’ compensation act immunity
prohibits the suit against the th ird party.
(2)

If the th ird -p arty d e fe n d an t is the owner of the corporate employer, manages

the corporation, provides w orkers’ compensation insurance coverage, and the injury is in
the scope of employment, then th at person is in e ffect an "employer" under the act and
therefo re cannot be a "third party" so as to abrogate workers’ compensation immunity.
(3)

Recent decisions indicate a more restrictive view of the right to pursue a
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claim against a corporate owner or manager in dividually than appeared in earlier decisions.
If an employee is not an "alter ego" of the corporation or supervisory employee, then he may
be sued fo r the negligent injury of a fellow employee, so long as the negligence is not the
mere fa ilu re to provide a safe place to work.
(4)

N o tw ithstanding the above rules, if the claim against the th ird -p arty

employer is not th at it is a joint tortfeasor but th at it has an express or implied indem nity
obligation to the th ird -p arty p la in tiff, then the claim may proceed because the "exclusive
remedy" provision does not apply to express or implied indem nity contracts, only tort
claims.
Although cases in which the injured party is allowed to sue a co-employee for
negligence are discussed below, Arkansas law firm ly establishes th at if the only negligence
is the fa ilu re to provide a safe place to work, then w orkers’ compensation benefits provide
the exclusive remedy. In the early leading case Neal v. Oliver. 246 Ark. 377, 438 S.W.2d 313
(1969), the injured party sued the owner of her corporate employer, alleging negligence in
assigning her to work on an unsafe machine. The trial court granted the d e fe n d a n t’s motion
fo r summary judgment. Significantly, on appeal the Supreme Court noted that the alleged
negligent act was the d e fe n d a n t’s "failure to provide a safe place for her to work as
required by state law. " Id. at 388, 438 S.W.2d at 319. The court noted th at the d efen d an t
owned the entire corporate stock with his wife, was the manager of the corporate employer,
provided w orkers’ compensation insurance coverage, and an employer-employee relationship
existed between the p la in tiff and d efen d an t at the time of the injury. The court
specifically concluded th at the d e fe n d an t and his wife "owned the corporate business and
they, as well as the corporation, were the employers. " Id. at 387, 438 S.W.2d at 318.
Accordingly, the court concluded th at under these circumstances the d e fe n d a n t was not a
"third party" separate from the employer and a ffirm e d the summary judgm ent in favor of
the defendant.
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Neal v. Oliver has been cited many times by later Arkansas appellate decisions in
support of the proposition th at an owner or supervisory employee ordinarily cannot be sued
in tort for an in ju ry covered by the w orkers’ compensation act. But a potentially
sig n ifican t fact m entioned by the Arkansas Supreme Court distinguishes Oliver from our
situation. In the same p aragraph in which the court noted th at the employer had provided
w orkers’ compensation insurance to the employee, the court noted th at the p la in tiff "was
not in ju red by a direct negligent act of Oliver, he wasn’t even on the premises when the
[p lain tiff] was in ju red . " Id . at 388, 438 S.W.2d at 319. This dovetails with the co u rt’s
statem ent of law, sum m arizing a review of cases from across the country, that a president
of a corporation or a business owner "may or may not" be an employee for workers’
compensation purposes, depending on each case’s facts. Id . at 387, 438 S.W.2d at 318.
The co u rt’s partial reliance on the e m p lo y e r/d e fen d a n t’s lack of involvement in the
actual accident in Neal was disregarded in Morgan Construction Co. v. L a rk a n . 254 Ark.
838, 496 S.W.2d 431 (1973). In th at case a d e fe n d an t prime contractor filed a th ird -p arty
com plaint against the owner of a subcontractor corporation seeking both contribution and
indem nity. The prime contractor relied on the third -p arty d e fe n d a n t’s alleged actual and
a ffirm a tiv e negligent act to attem pt to distinguish the case from Neal. The court rejected
this distinction and held th a t the owner, as an "employer" who provided workers’
compensation insurance, was immune from the claim.
N otw ithstanding L a rk a n , the distinction between being involved in an actual
negligent act and simply failing to m aintain a safe place to work has retained some life,
although th a t may be accidental. In Simmons First N at’l. Bank v. Thompson. 285 Ark. 275,
686 S.W.2d 415 (1985), the A rkansas Supreme Court held th at supervisory employees are
immune from a suit for negligence in failing to provide a safe place to work. The court, in
an opinion which like Neal relied on decisions from across the country, concluded that
since an employer is immune under the [workers’ compensation]
statutes from a negligent failu re to provide employees with a
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safe place to w ork, this same immunity protects supervisory
employees when their general duties involve the overseeing and
discharging of th at same responsibility.
285 Ark. at 278, 686 S.W.2d at 417 (emphasis added). To hold otherwise would "effectively

destroy" the immunity provisions of the workers’ compensation act. Id.
In Thompson, each d e fen d an t was a supervisory employee and moved for summary
judgm ent on the ground that "as supervisory employees" each was entitled to workers’
compensation act immunity. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirm ed summary judgments in
favor of the defendants but again found it im portant to note the lack of involvement of the
defendants in the actual accident:
None of the defendants was present at the place of the accident
or had any active part in the work that caused the chemicals to
enter the sewer. The complaint alleged negligence on the part
of each d e fen d an t in failing to discharge his responsibility to
make the premises safe.
285 Ark. at 276, 686 S.S.2d at 416. The court in Thompson conducted a fairly extensive
review of the law and nowhere mentioned L a rk a n . Thus, in Thompson the court arguably
appeared to retain or revive the distinction between a supervisory employee a ffirm ativ ely
committing a negligent act as opposed to one who merely failed to provide a safe working
environm ent and was sued solely as an owner or supervisor.
But the pendulum swung back and the "involved/uninvolved" distinction again was
ignored just two years later in Fore v. Circuit Court of Izard C ounty, 292 Ark. 13, 727
S.W.2d 840 (1985). In that case the supervisor was sued in tort for his alleged negligence in
"keying a microphone, causing dynam ite to explode. " Id . at 14, 727 S.W.2d at 841. This, of
course, involves an actual a ffirm ativ e act by the supervisor as opposed to a mere failure to
provide a safe workplace. Nevertheless, the court reversed the trial court’s denial of the
d e fe n d an t’s motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, concluding that the workers’
compensation im m unity protected the supervisor. The court in Fore appeared to limit the
right to sue the employer or a supervisor in tort to only those cases in which an intentional,
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w illful, or malicious act was committed by the employer or supervisor.
T h a t same year the Arkansas Supreme Court a ffirm e d a motion fo r summary
judgm ent in fav o r of several d e fe n d an t employees when the p la in tiff s ’ decedent was
electrocuted when bare electrical wires came into contact w ith a metal hopper. Five of the
six d efen d an ts ap p aren tly had some management or supervisory duties; the sixth was a
m aintenance employee. The court concluded th a t the supervisory employees automatically
were im m une from suit and th a t the m aintenance man also was immune because "failing to
repair or check fo r bare wires involves fa ilu re to provide a safe place to work. " Allen v.
Kizer. 294 Ark. 1, 6, 740 S.W.2d 137, 140 (1987).
While some cases have been allowed to proceed against fellow employees, those cases
involve a co-employee who clearly is not an alter ego of the corporation or even a
supervisory employee and the claim involves something more than merely failing to provide
a safe place to work. In K ing v. Cardin. 229 Ark. 929, 319 S.W.2d 214 (1959), the p la in tiff
was killed when a co-employee who obviously was not a high-level management employee or
alter ego of the company struck and killed the p la in tiff with a truck while they were
w orking on a highw ay construction project. The court noted that the workers’
compensation act provided exclusive remedies against the "employer" and th at a negligent
co-employee "is regarded as a th ird person" who may be sued in tort and is not protected by
the exclusive remedy of w orkers’ compensation benefits. A ju ry verdict in favor of the
decedent’s estate against the fellow employee was affirm ed .
K ing v. C ardin was cited with approval in Simmons First N a t’l. Bank v. Thompson.
supra. However, in th at case the court drew a distinction between Neal v. O liver, in which
a tort suit was disallowed, and King v. C ard in , in which the tort suit was perm itted, and
indicated th a t d o u b tfu l cases probably ought to be resolved in favor of the workers’
compensation act providing the exclusive remedy:
As we all know, the purpose of workers’ compensation statutes
was to change the common law by sh iftin g the burden of all
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w ork-related injuries from individual employers and employees
to the consuming public. In that e ffo rt the m atter of fau lt, as
Larson points out, is ordinarily immaterial. Employers were
compelled to give up the common-law defenses of contributory
fau lt, fellow servant, and assumption of risk. Employees were
compelled to give up the chance of recovering unlim ited
damages in fau lt-related cases in retu rn for a certain recovery
in a ll w ork-related cases. The p la in tiffs here are attem pting to
re tu rn to the common-law system based on fau lt, when it is to
th eir advantage to do so, but at the same time to retain the
assured benefits of w orkers’ compensation regardless of fault.
T h e invalidity of their position is too plain to require fu rth e r
discussion.
285 Ark. at 278-79, 686 S.W.2d at 417-18 (emphasis in original).
All of the above cases deal with claims in which the employee has attem pted to sue a
d e fen d an t who claims the protection of the workers’ compensation act’s "exclusive remedy"
provision. T h at provision, however, also prohibits suits by a th ird -p arty against any person
whom the employee could not sue directly. The Arkansas Supreme Court has decided this
precise question and concluded that such th ird -p arty complaints cannot be m aintained. The
court concluded th at the Arkansas General Assembly intended workers’ compensation to be
an employer’s exclusive liability for an on-the-job injury and, accordingly, prohibited thirdparty suits seeking contribution from the employer as a joint tortfeasor for the employee’s
injuries. W.M. Bashlin Co. v. Sm ith, 277 Ark. 406, 643 S.W.2d 526 (1982).

C.

Indem nity From the Employer.

The above discussion focuses on a claim in tort for contribution due to the
negligence or intentional acts of a fellow employee. U nder some circumstances, the
p la in tiff’s employer can be made a th ird -p arty defen d an t, based not on its tortious conduct
but upon its express or implied contractual agreements to indem nify the defendant. In C &
L R ural Cooperative Corp. v. K in c a id , 221 Ark. 450, 256 S.W.2d 337 (1953), the employer and
the d e fe n d an t had an express contract containing an indem nity provision under which the
employer agreed to hold the d e fe n d an t harmless in case of damages caused by their
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negligence. The court allowed that case to proceed because the claim against the employer
was not a claim for contribution among joint tortfeasors but was based upon an express
indem nity provision in their contract.
In many cases there may be no w ritten contract between the contractor and the
subcontractor. There may be, however, a work order or some other type of document which
should be exam ined to explore the possibility that some express indem nity language may
exist somewhere. If the parties to the agreement used a "standard form" or "fill in the
blanks" form of contract, it very likely may contain indem nity provisions which neither
party expressly considered at the time of contracting but which nevertheless are part of the
contract.
But sometimes indem nity will be allowed even when the contract does not expressly
provide that right. "Implied indemnity" was recognized in Oaklawn Jockey Club. Inc. v.
Pickens-Bond Construction Co., 251 Ark. 1100, 477 S.W.2d 477 (1972). In that case, an
injured employee brought a suit against Oaklawn and Arkansas Power & Light alleging
negligence in failing to provide a safe place to work. Oaklawn filed a third-party
complaint against the p la in tif f ’s employer for indemnity. Significantly, the contract did
not have an express indem nity provision so Oaklawn was seeking "implied indemnity. " The
trial court dismissed the th ird -p arty complaint but the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed.
Significantly, the court noted that
courts dealing with implied and contractual indem nity,
[citations omitted], ordinarily recognized that the co n tracto r’s
duty to indem nify the owner, under such circumstances, is not
controlled by the Workmen’s Compensation law.
Id. at 1101, 477 S.W.2d at 478. The court found a policy reason for allowing implied
indem nity by noting th at if the employee recovered damages against Oaklawn, then the
allegedly negligent employer would have the right to be reimbursed under its subrogation
lien fo r workers* compensation benefits paid to the p lain tiff. Without recognizing the right
of implied indem nity, then the loss would fall on the more innocent party and the negligent
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employer actually would receive payment from the innocent third party. The court
required, however, th at indem nity, w hether express or implied, could not be based on joint
tortfeasor status but on an "independent duty or obligation owed by the employer to the
th ird party. "
Several years later, the court attem pted to clarify the differen ce between joint
tortfeasor contribution and express or implied contractual indem nity by noting the proper
test: "Is the claim ' on account o f’ the injury, or on account of a separate obligation running
from the employer to the th ird party? " Morgan Construction Co. v. L a rk a n , 254 Ark. 838,
841, 496 S.W.2d 431, 433 (1973), q uoting Larson, Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 76.44.
The court in Morgan a ffirm ed the dismissal of a th ird -p arty complaint against the employer
on the ground th at it failed to plead an independent duty owed by the employer to the
d efen d an t which would give rise to an indem nity obligation.
PA RT 2: INSURANCE COVERAGE.
I.

THE 1986 COMMERCIAL GEN ERA L LIABILITY POLICY:
B A CKGROUND INFORMATION.

Although all insurance companies do not o ffe r general liability policies that are
word-for-w ord identical, standard form insurance policies are the foun d atio n of all
liability insurance policies. Each general liability policy is to some degree "customized" to
the individual policyholder by the addition or deletion of certain additional coverages or
exclusions, with a corresponding variation in premium, but in many essential respects the
insurance policies o ffered by the various underw riters are substantially and substantively
alike.
This is because virtually all insurance companies’ general liability policies follow the
standard form 1986 Commercial General Liability policy (h erein after the "CGL policy").
T hat form was widely adopted throughout the insurance industry in that year. T hat policy
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form superseded previous standard form general liability policies promulgated in 1973,
1966, and 1941.
II.

SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE 1986 COMMERCIAL GEN ERA L LIABILITY
POLICY.
A.

Coverages.
1.

Bodily Injury and Property Damage L iab ility .

The typical CGL form requires the insured to pay "those sums that the insured
becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of ' bodily in ju ry ’ or ' property damage’
to which this insurance applies. " The Insuring Agreement also provides that no other
obligation or liability to pay money or perform services is covered unless expressly or
explicitly provided for by supplem entary endorsements and payments.
"Bodily injury" is usually defined to mean "bodily injury, sickness or disease
sustained by a person, including death resulting from any of these at any time. " Of
p articu lar concern to oil and gas producers would be insurance for claims for injury
resulting from discharge of pollutants into ground water, the air, soil, or in any other
fashion which could cause a physical injury to a landowner or some other person. The CGL
policy, as will be detailed below, contains an exclusion specifically identifying bodily
injury allegedly resulting from pollutants.
"Bodily injury" has been given a very literal interpretation by Arkansas courts. It
has long been the rule th at the "bodily injury" requirem ent "limits the injury for which a
recovery may be had to a physical injury and does not include all injuries to the person or
personal injuries. " U nited States Fidelity & G uaranty Co. v. Shrigley. 26 F. Supp. 625, 628
(W.D. Ark. 1939) (husband’s claim for loss of services of his wife because of the w ife’s
bodily injuries was not covered). Claims for embarrassment, hum iliation, mental anguish,
and emotional distress also do not constitute a "bodily injury. " Rowlett C ounty v. Western
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Casualty & Surety Co., 425 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. 1978). More recently, in a case argued on
behalf of the insurance company by the author of this paper, an Arkansas federal court
ruled th at a sexual harassment claim by an employee against an employer, even if proved to
include nonconsensual physical contact, did not state a claim for "bodily injury" covered by
insurance. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sky. Inc., 810 F. Supp. 249 (W.D. Ark. 1992).
At this point it may be appropriate to point out, especially fo r non-lawyers, that the
courts which fou n d th a t the acts described above did not constitute a "bodily injury" for
insurance coverage purposes were not saying th at the p la in tiff did not have a viable lawsuit
against the insured party. R ather, the courts were saying that the claims made by the
p la in tiff simply are not covered by the insurance policy and the insured is left on its own to
defend the case and pay any settlement or judgment.
2.

The "Occurrence" R equirem ent.

The CGL form usually provides that, "The ' bodily in ju ry ’ or ' property dam age’ must
be caused by an 'occurrence.’" The word "occurrence" is usually defin ed as "an accident,
including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harm ful
conditions. "
In several situations courts have seized on the word "accident" to fin d coverage
excluded because the d e fe n d a n t’s alleged conduct or the p la in tif f ’s alleged injury was not
an "accident. " In a case which may have some analogy to certain kinds of landow ner claims
against energy companies and their subcontractors, the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that
claims for trespass to land and conversion of crops were not covered by the d e fe n d a n t’s
liability policy because these alleged acts were not accidental. Likewise, insureds who were
sued fo r pum ping w ater from their land into a small drainage ditch which crossed a
neighbor’s land and caused flooding also were not covered by liability insurance because it
was not an "accident. " The Arkansas Supreme Court provided a d e fin itio n for "accident" as
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"an event th at takes place w ithout one’s foresight or expectation—an event that proceeds
from an unknow n cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause, and therefore not
expected. " C ontinental Ins. Co. v. Hodges. 259 Ark. 541, 542, 534 S.W.2d at 764, 765 (1976).
In the context of oil and gas production, it is easy to imagine how intentional acts of
the site work or drilling personnel could go awry and have unintended consequences. If,
however, the "occurrence" was not an "accident, " because the underlying act was done
intentionally, then insurance protection is not available. Whether the lawsuit presents
claims arising from an "occurrence" or "accident" may ultimately depend on how the
p la in tiff pleads the case in the complaint.
3.

The Punitive Damages Issue.

The A rkansas Supreme Court specifically has held that punitive damages are covered
by an automobile insurance policy having broad coverage language. In Southern Farm
Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Daniel. 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582 (1969), the subject
automobile insurance policy provided coverage for "all sums which the insured shall become
legally obligated to pay as damages... because of bodily injuries... and... injury to or
destruction of property...." The Arkansas Supreme Court held that this broad language
required the insurer to pay the punitive damages aw ard as well as compensatory damages.
This holding was re a ffirm ed in C alifornia Union Insurance Co. v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas
Co. 264 Ark. 449, 572 S.W.2d 393 (1978).
Some policies’ coverage clauses are distinguishable from those in Southern Farm
Bureau and C alifornia Union and, thus, arguably a d iffe re n t result should be reached. The
policy in Southern, and apparently the policy in C alifornia U nion, provided coverage for
"all sums" which the insured "shall become legally obligated to pay as damages... because of
bodily injuries. " In contrast, many policies state that the company will pay damages "for"
bodily injury or property damage. Although it cannot be said with any assurance that an
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Arkansas appellate court would not fin d the distinction in language too minor to make any
difference, there is certainly an argum ent to be made that the latter policy language covers
only bodily injury or property damage and not punitive damages because punitive damages
are not "for" the described losses of "bodily injury or property damage. " The policies in the
other cases, again, provided coverage for "all sums" for which the insured became liable
"because of" bodily injuries and property damage. At best, though, all I can tell you is that
there is an argum ent to be made based on the d ifferen ce in policy language; the general
rule of law in Arkansas at this time is that punitive damages are covered by broad policy
language in some policies, which may be distinguished from similar, though not identical,
language in other forms.
This discussion concerns only the issue of initial coverage of punitive damages
claims. A nationw ide survey of cases considering w hether punitive damages are covered
under various forms of liability policies is found in Liability Insurance Coverage as
Extending to Liability for Punitive or Exemplary Damages. 16 A.L.R. 4th 11 (1982 and
Supp. 1993). In the following section on "exclusions from coverage, " policy provisions
potentially excluding otherwise covered punitive damages claims will be considered.
B.

Exclusions.

The CGL contains a number of exclusions from coverage. An "exclusion," as the
name implies, excludes from coverage a claim which otherwise would be covered. The
CGL’s exclusions, in summary, are:
1.

Bodily injury or property damage "expected or intended from the standpoint

of the insured. " This clause, though not expressly naming punitive damages in the
exclusion, has the practical effect of excluding from coverage many, if not most, of the
kinds of acts and resulting claims which are the factual basis of a punitive damages prayer
for relief. See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sky. Inc., 810 F. Supp. 249 (W.D. Ark.
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1992). An an notation exam ining nationw ide interp retatio n of this exclusion, including its
use in excluding coverage for punitive damages, is Construction and A pplication of
Provision of L iability Insurance Policy Expressly Excluding Injuries Expected or Intended
by In su red , 31 A.L.R. 4th 957 (1984 and Supp. 1993).
2.

Bodily injury or property damage which the insured is obligated to pay

because of the assumption of liability in a contract or agreement. Many contracts between
prime contractors and subcontractors have "assumption of liability" clauses. If liability is
imposed on an insured only because of a contract and not because that party would have
been liable fo r the in ju ry even in the absence of the contract or agreement, then the claim is
excluded from insurance coverage.
3.

Bodily injury or property damage for which the insured may be held liable

because of causing or contrib u tin g to the intoxication of any person.
4.

Any obligation of the insured arising under a w orkers’ compensation,

d isability benefits, unem ploym ent compensation, or other similar law.
5.

Bodily in ju ry to a spouse, child, parent, brother, or sister of the employee if

the in ju ry arose out of and in the course of employment by the insured.
6.

Bodily injury or property damage arising out of the "actual, alleged or

threaten ed discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants. " The word "pollutants" is
d e fin ed as "any solid, liquid, gaseous or therm al irrita n t or contam inant, including smoke,
vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste. " It is easy to see how many of the
claims which may be made, p articularly by a landowner, arising out of the drilling of an oil
or gas well could fall under the pollution exclusion.
A num ber of policies, however, have a limitation on the exclusion arising when the
discharge is "sudden and accidental. " The rationale is th at a "sudden and accidental"
discharge of pollutants is much more akin to the trad itio n al type of accidental injury,
w hether to person or property, tra d itio n ally covered by insurance. When that limitation on
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the exclusion applies, the exclusion would exclude coverage only for pollutants which are
discharged or allowed to escape either intentionally or over an extended period of time.
For a detailed discussion of judicial interpretation of the pollution exclusion, see R.
Chemers & R. Franco, The Contemporary View of the Pollution Exclusion—A Provincial
A pproach, Selected Issues in Insurance Coverage and Practice (Defense Research Institute
1990).
7.

Bodily injury or property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance,

use, or entrustm ent to others of any automobile, a irc ra ft, or w atercraft.
8.

Bodily injury or property damage arising out of the transportation of "mobile

equipment" by an automobile owned or operated by an insured.
9.

Bodily injury or property damage due to war.

10.

Property damage to the insured’s own property. The rationale is that these

items trad itio n ally are covered by (and paid for) other types of insurance.
11.

Property damage to "your product" or "your work" and related claims.

C.

"Additional" Coverages.

The CGL policy typically offers "additional" coverages for "personal and advertising
injury liability" and "medical payments. " There often are "Supplementary Payments"
available covering miscellaneous items like bail bonds, attachm ent bonds, prejudgment
interest, etc. These coverages are not discussed because they are outside the scope of this
paper.
D.

Who is an "Insured"?

The "insured" is the person(s) or en tity /e n titie s designated in the "declarations" page.
The declarations page also provides inform ation concerning policy limits, policy periods,
etc.
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If the insured is an individual, typically the spouse is also an insured, but for both
only with respect to the conduct of a business of which the insured is the sole owner.
If the insured is a partnership or joint venture, all members or partners and their
spouses are insureds, but only with respect to the conduct of the p artn ersh ip ’s or joint
venture’s business.
If the insured is a corporation, executive officers and directors are also insured, but
only with respect to their duties as officers or directors. The stockholders also are insureds,
but only with respect to their liability as stockholders.
The insured’s employees, other than executive officers, are also insured, but only for
acts committed w ithin the scope of their employment. Typically, this provision is limited
by excluding coverage for injuries arising in the course of employment.
III.

THE IN SU R ED ’S DUTIES IN THE EVENT OF AN OCCURRENCE, CLAIM, OR
SUIT.
The insured has an obligation to promptly notify the insurer when a covered claim is

made against the insured or a lawsuit which may be covered by the insurance policy is
filed. Failure to do so may result in the insurer’s being able to disclaim coverage and avoid
paying an otherwise insured obligation.
From the in su rer’s standpoint, disclaiming coverage for breach of the duty to
cooperate in the defense is a severe step, because a wrong decision can expose the insurance
company to liability not only on the underlying claim by the injured party but also by the
insured for a w rongful disclaimer of coverage. Nevertheless, under the proper set of facts
the in su red ’s failu re to cooperate in the lawsuit can result in loss of insurance policy
protection.
Perhaps the most frequently-occurring event concerning the insured’s breach of its
duty to the insurer involves the topic of notification. An energy company, like any insured
business, should have a firmly-established procedure for notifying its insurer of any
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possibly covered claim made against it. Furtherm ore, promptly notifying the insurer upon
receipt of a lawsuit, as opposed to a nonlitigation claim, against the insured is even more
vital. If the insurer is not notified in a timely fashion that the insured has been sued, no
answer is filed, and a d efa u lt judgm ent results, then the insurer may escape responsibility
for paying an otherwise covered loss simply due to the insured’s failu re to report the
lawsuit. On the other hand, if the suit is reported promptly to the insurer and the insurer
or its defense counsel allows a d efau lt in answering to occur, then the insurer may become
liable for the entire judgm ent entered against the insured, even if that judgm ent is greater
than the insurance policy limits. The rationale, obviously, is that if the insured defendant
promptly reports the lawsuit and the insurer causes the d efau lt judgm ent to occur through
its own neglect, then the insurer is responsible for not only the entry of the judgment but
also the size of the judgm ent and, in fairness to the insured, the insurer should pay the
entire am ount even if that exceeds the policy limits.
IV.

DEALING WITH YOUR INSURANCE AGENT.
Arkansas, like most states, recognizes the distinction between a "general agent" and a

"soliciting agent. " A general agent has the power to bind the insurance company to risks
and to make contracts on behalf of the insurance company. A soliciting agent, in contrast,
only has the a u th o rity to accept applications and forw ard inform ation and payments to the
insurer. A soliciting agent cannot change the terms of an insurance policy or make any
additional agreements. Jackson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am erica, 736 F. 2d 450, 454 (8th Cir.
1984); H unt v. Pyramid Life Ins. Co., 21 Ark. App. 261, 267, 732 S.W.2d 167, 170 (1987).
It is a general rule of law that one who deals with an agent is bound to determine the
scope of his authority. H unt v. Pyramid Life Ins. Co., supra. When dealing with an
insurance agent, it is crucial to establish w hether the agent actually has the authority to
commit the insurer to any undertakings. An insurer, however, may give its limited agents
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such an appearance of having authority to bind the insurer that the insurer cannot later
deny the agent’s actions. This is the doctrine of "apparent authority." Dixie Ins. Co. v. Joe
Works Chevrolet. Inc., 298 Ark. 106, 110, 766 S.W.2d 4, 7 (1989). This doctrine, significantly,
could also be used against oil and gas companies.
Furthermore, any "understandings" between the insured and its insurer should be
reduced to writing so that there is no misunderstanding at a later, crucial time. If there is a
misunderstanding, it usually will come to light only because a problem with a claim or a
lawsuit has led to a conflict between the insured and the insurer.
Finally, as noted previously, if a lawsuit is filed against the insured the insurer must
be notified promptly. Failure to notify the insurer may result in a loss of insurance
coverage on the claim. But failure of the insurer to protect the insured’s interests when
notified of the suit may result in the insurer being responsible for the entire claim, even if
larger than the policy limits or subject to an exclusion.
V.

INSURER’S "BAD FAITH" LIABILITY.
The whole area of insurer’s bad faith is a relatively new area of Arkansas law. For

years Arkansas has had a statute which provided for a twelve percent penalty and
attorney’s fees for a plaintiff prevailing in a "direct action" against an insurer on an
insurance policy. Ark. Code Ann. § 23-79-208 (1987). In 1983, however, the Supreme Court
of Arkansas specifically decided that this statute was not the exclusive remedy for failure
to pay a claim and did not preempt a "tort of bad faith" action against an insurer failing to
pay a claim. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 281 Ark. 128, 664 S.W.2d
463 (1983). The court in that case made the following statement:
[I]n order to be successful a claim based on the tort of bad faith
must include affirm ative misconduct by the insurance
company, without a good faith defense, and that the
misconduct must be dishonest, malicious, or oppressive in an
attempt to avoid its liability under an insurance policy. Such a
claim cannot be based upon good faith denial, offers to
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compromise a claim or for other honest errors of judgment by
the insurer. Neither can this type claim be based upon
negligence or bad judgment so long as the insurer is acting in
good faith. We agree with the Ohio Supreme Court in
Columbus Finance v. Howard. 42 Ohio St.2d 178, 327 N.E.2d 654
(1975), holding that in an action of this type for tort, actual
malice is that state of mind under which a person’s conduct is
characterized by hatred, ill will or a spirit of revenge. Actual
malice may be inferred from conduct and surrounding
circumstances.
The court in Broadway Arms did not find whether the facts in that case amounted to bad
faith. The court did find that there was a question sufficient to justify trial on the bad
faith claim when, among other things, the agent threatened the insured by stating that the
insurer might be called upon to explain to authorities why it paid $75,000 on a loss when
the insured’s books revealed that it had valued the inventory at $23,000 for tax purposes.
an additional passage amplifying the tort of bad faith in Arkansas is found in a separate
opinion in Broadway Arms, which concurred in part and dissented in part:
The tort can only be based upon an affirm ative action of
intentional, dishonest, malicious, or oppressive conduct by a
company to avoid its liability. Those are strong words, and
impose a heavy burden on an insured, as they well should,
because Arkansas has an adequate remedy for an insured
against a company that either refuses or through nonfeasance
will not honor its contract obligations. See Ark. Stat. § 66-3001
et sea. (Repl. 1980). While good reasons for recognizing this
cause of action exist, the tort should not be merely a new legal
tool to collect attorney’s fees, or a means of intimidating the
insurance industry so it cannot fairly and reasonably resist
false, suspicious or even disputed claims.
That is the reason I characterized the new tort as outrage,
because it better describes the kind of conduct that should
result in punishment. Bad faith can be, in my judgment,
interpreted by jurors as merely negligence, and this tort is not
one of negligence—it is one of intentional, malicious, dishonest
and oppressive conduct.
281 Ark. at 139-40 (Hickman, J., concurring and dissenting).
The separate opinion then went on to note that, although the court was not actually
deciding the issue, the evidence against Aetna in that case "does not justify a finding that
Aetna is guilty of such conduct. Negligence, and poor judgment, probably; outrageous
37

conduct, hardly."
Obviously, these statements from this leading case indicate that the insured has a
heavy burden in succeeding in a bad faith claim against an insurer. Two later cases also are
instructive in showing the kind of conduct that the Arkansas Supreme Court is concerned
with in the tort of bad faith. There appear to be no reported Arkansas cases dealing with a
"bad faith" claim by an energy company against its liability insurer. In Employers
Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 282 Ark. 29, 665 S.W.2d 873 (1984), the insurer cancelled
the insured’s coverage after the insured suffered a heart attack, claiming that the insured
had failed to pay his premium. The insured produced checks showing that all of the
premiums had been paid. More significantly, the insurer’s payment records showed
evidence of alteration. The court found that this was substantial evidence from which the
jury could find that the insured had paid the premiums and that the insurer later
fraudulently altered its own records to falsely show that the policy had lapsed for
nonpayment.
In a 1985 case, the Arkansas Supreme Court did not express a definite opinion as to
whether the insurer’s conduct amounted to bad faith but did remand the case for trial on
that issue. In Thomas v. Farm Bureau Insurance Co., 287 Ark. 313, 698 S.W.2d 508 (1985), a
state trooper testified that he was told by the insurer to "go out there and scare the people
so they would settle" while he was conducting an arson investigation. The state trooper
further testified that he wasn’t on so much an investigation as a "mission of intimidation"
and that his investigation produced no evidence whatsoever of arson. A jury verdict in the
insurer’s favor was reversed on the grounds that the trial court improperly excluded
evidence that Farm Bureau violated the Arkansas Arson Reporting Immunity Act.
Essentially, Farm Bureau did not make the required reportings to the state for suspected
arson. The Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that the trial court erred in not admitting this
evidence. The court found that the evidence was relevant to the question of whether Farm
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Bureau in good faith believed there was a possibility of arson or in bad faith was using that
allegation against the insured to intimidate him in settling the claim.
In these and several other post-Broadway Arms cases, the Arkansas Supreme Court
has not established a specific set of elements which must be met in order for a plaintiff to
prove the tort of bad faith. Instead, each case generally describes what bad faith entails
and then decides whether the facts of that case amount to bad faith.
PART 3: WORKERS’ COMPENSATION.
I.

INTRODUCTION.
Arkansas workers’ compensation law recently has undergone a significant change.

The original Arkansas workers’ compensation act was passed in 1948-49. A substantial
revision of that act took place in 1975. There have been a number of amendments to the act
since 1975, but the basic provisions of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Act had been in
place since 1975, if not in place since the original act in 1949.
In 1993, the Arkansas legislature found that the state’s workers’ compensation act
needed substantial revision. Accordingly, the General Assembly enacted a number of
substantive and substantial changes to the act. This revision was the most wide-ranging
change in Arkansas workers’ compensation law since the original 1949 act and the 1975
revision.
The 1993 amendments to the workers’ compensation statute apply only to injuries
which occur after July 1, 1993.
II.

TO WHOM WORKERS’ COMPENSATION DUTIES ARE OWED.
Under the new Arkansas act, every employer should "secure" compensation to its

employees" to pay or provide compensation for their disability or death from a
compensable injury "arising out of and in the course of employment without regard to fault
39

as a cause of the injury." Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-401(a)(1).
"Employee" under the new act is defined as
any person, including a minor, whether lawfully or unlawfully
employed in the service of an employer under any contract of
hire or apprenticeship, written or oral, express or implied; but
excluding one whose employment is casual and not in the
course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of his
employer....
Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(10). The definition continues to note that a sole proprietor or
partner who devotes full time to the proprietorship or partnership is a statutory "employee"
for workers' compensation purposes. Sole proprietors or partners are given the option of
"opting out" of workers’ compensation coverage (and, as a probable result, of paying
insurance premiums) by filing a certificate of noncoverage with the Workers’ Compensation
Commission.
An independent contractor is not a statutory "employee" and no workers’
compensation liability is owed by the principal to the contractor or the contractor’s
employees. A number of factors, including control of the method of performing the work,
mode for determining payment owed, who is obligated to furnish tools, equipment, and
materials, and the right to cease the employment without further liability are considered in
determining whether one is an employee or an independent contractor. Purdy’s Flower Shop
v. Livingston. 262 Ark. 575, 580, 559 S.W.2d 24, 27 (1977).
In contrast, a "subcontractor," which is defined as one who takes a portion of a
contract from a prime contractor, is responsible for securing compensation to its employees.
But if the "subcontractor" fails to do so, the prime contractor is responsible for workers’
compensation benefits to the subcontractor’s employees. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-401 (1993
Supp.)
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III.

A "COMPENSABLE INJURY."
A.

Definitions and Criteria.

Only "compensable injuries" are covered by the workers’ compensation act. Under
the new statute, a "compensable injury" means, in general, an accidental injury causing
physical harm to the body arising out of and in the course of employment "only if it is
caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and place of occurrence." Ark.
Code Ann. § 1l-9-102(5)(A)(i).
Some physical conditions requiring medical care and creating a disability are in fact
related to employment activities but are not caused by a specific accident and arise over a
period of time. If this type of injury arises out of and in the course of employment but is
not caused by a specific incident or is not identifiable by time and place, it still is a
compensable injury if it is a repetitive motion injury such as carpal tunnel syndrome, a
back injury not caused by a specific incident or identifiable by time and place of
occurrence, or a hearing loss not caused by a specific incident or identifiable by time and
place of occurrence. Id. at (2)(i).
Mental illnesses or injuries were given a substantially more restrictive definition,
now being required to be caused by physical injury to the employee’s body (unless the
employee was a victim of a violent crime). The section relating to mental illness or injury
also places stricter requirements on the medical/psychological/psychiatric proof to be
offered in support of such a finding.
Heart or lung injuries, including heart attacks, are compensable only if an accident
is the "major cause" of the physical harm. Furthermore, the heart or lung illness or injury is
not compensable unless it is shown that the exertion of the work necessary to precipitate the
disability or death "was extraordinary and unusual in comparison to the employee’s usual
work in the course of the employee’s regular employment or, alternatively, that some
41

unusual and unpredicted incident occurred which is found to have been the major cause of
the physical harm." Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-114(b)(1). Subsection (2) of that statute adds
that physical or mental stress shall not be considered. The phrase "major cause" means more
than 50 percent of the cause, established according to the preponderance of the evidence.
Ark. Code Ann. §11-9-102(14).
A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence, supported by
"objective findings." The phrase "objective findings" is defined as "those findings which
cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient." The definition goes on to
specifically state that when determining physical or anatomical impairment, neither a
physician, other medical provider, administrative law judge, workers’ compensation
commission, nor the courts may consider complaints of pain or, for the purpose of making
physical or anatomical impairment ratings, straight-leg raising tests or range-of-motion
tests. The definition finally states that medical opinions addressing compensability and the
degree of permanent impairment must be stated within a reasonable degree of medical
certainty. All these requirements are more restrictive than the Arkansas workers’
compensation law prior to the 1993 amendments.
B.

Designated Noncompensable In juries.

Under the new Act, compensable injuries specifically do not include
(1)

Injury resulting from a work place fight if the fight was the result of a non

employment-related hostility.
(2)

Except for innocent victims, injuries caused by horseplay.

(3)

Injury caused by recreational or social activities. Presumably this is an

attempt to cut back on the "company picnic injury" as being a compensable injury.
(4)

Any injury inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services

were not being performed.
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(5)

An injury when the accident was "substantially occasioned" by the use of

alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs used in contravention of the physician’s orders.
The presence of alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs used in contravention of a
physician’s orders shall create a rebuttable presumption that the injury is noncompensable.
Furthermore, that section of the statute provides that every employee is deemed to have
impliedly consented to "reasonable and responsible testing by properly trained medical or
law enforcement personnel" for the presence of any contraband substances in the employee’s
body. If any of these substances is found, the employee is not entitled to compensation
unless it is proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the substance did not
"substantially occasion" the injury or accident.
IV.

BURDEN OF PROOF.
The 1993 act also changes requirements concerning burden of proof. For an

accidental injury causing internal or external physical harm to the body, the employee shall
have the burden of proving the claim by a preponderance of the evidence. This is in
accordance with prior law.
For the repetitive motion injuries, back injury not caused by a specific incident,
hearing loss not caused by a specific incident, mental illness, heart, cardiovascular injury,
accident or disease, or hernia, the employee must prove the claim by the preponderance of
the evidence and the condition is compensable "only if the alleged compensable injury is the
major cause of the disability or need for treatment." Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(E)(ii).
This is a substantive change from prior law.
V.

LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION ABOLISHED.
Under the former law, judges were to construe the workers’ compensation act

liberally, in favor of the claimant/employee. Under the 1993 revisions, workers’
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compensation judges and the Arkansas appellate courts shall construe the provisions
"strictly." Ark. Code Ann. § 1l-9-704(c)(3). An earlier amendment to the statute already
had changed the act’s longtime requirement that the commission and courts resolve doubts
in the evidence in favor of the employee to a standard requiring the evidence to be viewed
impartially. The 1993 amendment seems to follow the previous amendment by changing the
rules for construing the act as well as for reviewing the evidence.
VI.

EXCLUSIVE REMEDY.
The workers’ compensation act provides the exclusive remedies available to an

injured employee. If, however, the employer fails to "secure" the payment of compensation
as required by this chapter (basically, by either purchasing workers’ compensation
insurance or satisfying the commission and receiving permission to proceed as a self-insured
employer), then the employer may be subjected to fines by the workers’ compensation
commission and an injured employee has the option to proceed with either a workers’
compensation claim (with statutorily-limited damages but no requirement to prove the
employer was at fault) or a tort suit against the employer (with potentially unlimited
damages but a duty to show that the accident was caused by fault of the employer).
VII.

CONCLUSION; NOT COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW.
The 1993 act was such a substantial rewriting of Arkansas workers’ compensation

law that any comprehensive review would be voluminous. The author assumes that the
employers attending the institute or reviewing this paper either have workers’ compensation
insurance or, if self-insured, have a knowledgeable workers’ compensation claims
administrator either in-house or on contract. Accordingly, for present purposes this paper
attempts to cover only some of the changes in or continued rules related to basic liabilities.
There has been no attempt to review benefits payable or procedural issues involved in
44

making or defending workers’ compensation claims.
In the event that you or your employer has a workers’ compensation claim filed
against it which is not covered by an existing insurance policy (in which case the insurance
company would do its own claims managing), then in light of the new act it is imperative
that a qualified workers’ compensation attorney be consulted. The "bottom line" is that
assumptions and knowledge concerning workers’ compensation claims and Arkansas
workers' compensation law which may have been valid for years may no longer be valid
today. Any person either pursuing or defending a workers’ compensation claim should fully
investigate the impact of the new law.
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